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An optimal tax system equates the marginal cost of public funds across all tax bases.  
This idea is applied to a federation to derive the optimal unconditional transfers that will 
promote an optimal allocation of taxation and expenditures among the governments in the 
federation.  This approach provides insights into the concepts of vertical and horizontal 
fiscal imbalance, fiscal capacity, and fiscal need.  Expressions for the optimal fiscal 
equalization grant and the optimal vertical fiscal gap are derived.  We also show how the 
marginal cost of public funds affects the optimal matching grant rate for activities that 
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1.0 Introduction 
Most reviews of the literature on intergovernmental grants rarely mention the 
theory of optimal taxation and expenditures, which was developed in the 1970s and 
1980s and which provides the welfare foundations for tax reform and cost-benefit 
analysis.  Aside from a passing reference to Roger Gordon’s 1983 paper “An Optimal 
Tax Approach to Fiscal Federalism,” there are no references to the optimal tax literature 
in Oates (1999, 2005), and none in Shah (2007), Boadway (2007), or Spahn (2007).  
Evidence of this neglect is contained in Oates’ description of the “First Generation” 
theory of fiscal federalism as based on the work of Samuelson, Musgrave, and Arrow—
all towering figures in the 1950s and 1960s public finance literature—and the emerging 
“Second Generation” theory of fiscal federalism which emphasizes “political processes 
and the behavior of political agents” and “problems of information”.  Clearly missing 
from Oates’ description of the building blocks of the theory of fiscal federalism are the 
key works on optimal taxation and expenditure policies by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), 
Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Atkinson and Stern (1974), and Diamond (1976) and the 
literature on the reform of fiscal policies, largely based on the concept of the marginal 
cost of public funds, in Wildasin (1984), Browning (1987), Triest (1990), Mayshar 
(1991), and Ballard and Fullerton (1992) to name but a few of the key references in this 
large literature. 
The failure to incorporate the key ideas and concepts of the optimal taxation 
literature in the theory of fiscal federalism (except perhaps with regard to tax 
competition) is puzzling because the optimal tax literature provides a solid welfare 
foundation for the analysis of many of the key aspects of federalism, especially   3 
intergovernmental grants.  For the most part, the optimal tax approach to 
intergovernmental grants complements, rather than conflicts, with the conventional 
discussion of the role of intergovernmental transfers in a federation.  It can shed light on 
the previously ill-defined concepts of fiscal imbalance, fiscal capacity, and fiscal needs, 
and it provides an analytical foundation for the provision of unconditional grants to 
address vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances in a federation and for the matching 
rates for conditional grants to address expenditure externalities. 
  The key concept in the optimal taxation/tax reform literature is the marginal cost 
of public funds (MCF) which is a measure of the burden that is imposed on a society 
when the government raises an additional dollar of tax revenue through a tax rate 
increase.  The additional burden includes the marginal welfare loss that arises because a 
tax rate increase causes a further distortion in the allocation of a society’s resources.  
Equity concerns are normally at least as important as efficiency issues, and the MCF 
concept can be augmented to reflect the distributional effects of taxes on different income 
groups in a society and distributional weights used to incorporate these losses in the 
measured social loss from a tax increase.  We will refer to the distributionally-weighted 
MCF as the social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF).  As we will argue below, these 
concepts can play a key role in developing a normative theory of intergovernmental 
grants.   
In Section 2.1, we describe the welfare foundations for a system of unconditional 
intergovernmental grants that addresses the problems of vertical and horizontal fiscal 
imbalance in a federation.  Vertical fiscal balance in taxation is achieved when the 
SMCF is equalized between the central government and the subnational governments and   4 
horizontal fiscal balance in taxation occurs when the SMCF is the same for all 
subnational governments.  There is a vertical fiscal balance in expenditures when the 
ratio of the distributionally-weighted marginal benefits of the public services provided by 
a subnational government and the central government is equal to their relative marginal 
costs of production. Horizontal fiscal balance in expenditures occurs when the ratio of 
the distributionally-weighted marginal benefits from the public services provided by any 
two subnational governments is equal to the ratio of their marginal costs of production.  
Fiscal imbalances occur when the SMCFs are not equalized between levels of 
government or across subnational governments, and federations usually require systems 
of unconditional transfers to eliminate these imbalances. 
  In Section 2.2, we derive an expression for the optimal equalization grants to 
eliminate horizontal fiscal imbalances by equalizing the SMCFs among the subnational 
governments.  The optimal equalization grant to a subnational government will be 
decreasing with its fiscal capacity and increasing in its expenditure needs.  Fiscal 
capacity is the ability of a government to raise revenues at a low MCF.  It depends not 
only on the size of a government’s tax base, but also on the tax sensitivity of its tax base.  
The greater the tax sensitivity of the base, the lower a government’s fiscal capacity 
because its marginal cost of public funds will be higher.  The conventional measure of 
fiscal capacity—the size of a government’s tax bases relative to some standard—is at best 
an approximation to a government’s true fiscal capacity and may exaggerate the true 
fiscal capacities of small subnational governments.  Expenditure needs are defined 
(within the context of the optimal equalization grant formula) as the amount a subnational 
government would spend on providing public services if it had the same SMCF as other   5 
subnational governments.  The cost of producing public services, the strength of the 
preference for local public services, equity considerations, and the SMCF will jointly 
determine the expenditure needs of a subnational government.  The SMCF affects the 
expenditure needs component of the optimal equalization grant because it reflects 
“affordability” and therefore determines how generous the equalization program will be.  
If all subnational governments have the same expenditure needs and their tax bases are 
equally tax sensitive, the optimal equalization grant formula will be the same as the 
representative tax system (RTS) equalization grant formula, which can be thought of as 
an approximation to the optimal equalization grant. 
 The  vertical fiscal gap in a federation can be defined as the proportion of 
subnational government spending that is financed by transfers from the central 
government.  In Section 2.3, we derive an expression for the optimal vertical fiscal gap, 
which equalizes the MCFs of the two levels of government in a federation.  We show that 
the optimal fiscal gap implements the Ramsey Rule for optimal taxation in a federal 
context—the tax bases of the two levels of government should be reduced in the same 
proportion.  Under certain conditions, the optimal fiscal gap also implements the Inverse 
Elasticity Rule of optimal taxation, which implies that each level of government’s tax rate 
should be inversely proportional to the elasticity of its tax base.  Since subnational 
governments’ tax bases are usually more tax sensitive than the central government’s tax 
bases, the optimal fiscal system will involve relatively high taxes at the federal level and 
transfers to subnational governments.  Only rarely will the optimal fiscal gap be zero, i.e. 
each level of government raises enough revenue to cover its own expenditures.  The 
optimal fiscal gap will be higher when (a) the central government’s expenditure   6 
responsibilities are lower, (b) the subnational governments’ expenditure responsibilities 
are higher, (c) the central government’s fiscal capacity is higher, or (d) when the 
subnational governments’ fiscal capacities are lower.  Consequently, a country’s 
expenditure assignment and tax assignment will determine its optimal fiscal gap. 
Expenditure externalities occur when the public services provided by a 
subnational government affect the residents of other subnational governments.  Matching 
grants from the central government can correct the potential biases in subnational 
governments’ expenditure decisions by altering the “prices” that they face.  The 
conventional rule is to set the matching grant rate equal to the proportion of the total 
marginal benefit of the activity that accrues to non-residents.  In Section 3.0, we consider 
how the optimal matching grants need to be modified to take into account the SMCFs of 
the central and subnational governments.   If the federation has achieved vertical and 
horizontal fiscal balance through a system of unconditional intergovernmental transfers, 
the optimal matching rate is equal to the distributionally-weighted direct external effect 
and the indirect external effect on the revenues of other subnational governments, valued 
at the common SMCF, as a percentage of the total social marginal benefit from the 
activity.  The matching rate will be increasing in the SMCF if the activity reduces the 
revenues of the subnational government that undertakes the activity.  The matching rate 
will normally be increasing with the SMCF when the activity increases the revenue of other 
jurisdictions.  We also show that if there is a vertical fiscal imbalance in a federation, where 
the central government has a lower SMCF than the subnational governments, then the 
matching rate will be increased because there is a social gain from shifting more of the 
costs of the activity to the central government because it can finance the activity at a lower   7 
social cost.  On the other hand, if there is horizontal fiscal imbalance, where the activity is 
undertaken by a “rich” subnational government with a low SMCF, then the matching rate 
will be reduced 
 
2.0 Fiscal  Imbalances  and Unconditional Grants 
  A fiscal imbalance has often been defined as a mismatch between a government’s 
spending responsibilities and its access to tax revenues.  See, for example, Breton (1996, 
p.197).  This definition of a vertical fiscal imbalance implies that an entire tier of 
subnational governments is unable to fund their spending responsibilities from their own 
revenue sources.  Taken literally, this would imply that all governments are at the top of 
their Laffer curves and cannot raise any more revenues by raising their tax rates.  While 
this might occur in some rare situations, it is surely not a generic problem.  Subnational 
governments can almost always raise more tax revenue by increasing their tax rates, but 
they do not want to because the marginal cost of raising additional tax revenue is very 
high.  A further problem with the conventional definition is that while the spending 
responsibilities of the subnational governments may be listed in a country’s constitution, 
the level of spending and the quality of these services are not specified.  Consequently, 
we can never really determine whether governments have met their “spending 
responsibilities”.  Confronted with these shaky conceptual foundations, empirical studies 
of vertical fiscal imbalance have simply measured the extent to which subnational 
government spending is financed by central government transfers.
1  However, this is an 
                                                   
1 A recent OECD (2007, p.8) report on intergovernmental transfers defines a vertical fiscal imbalance as 
“the difference between own tax revenue and own expenditure of a jurisdiction.”  See Rodden and Wibbels 
(2002), and Bird and Tarasov (2004) for empirical studies of the vertical fiscal gap.   8 
accounting measure of fiscal imbalance, not an economics-based measure of an 
imbalance in the allocation of spending and taxation in a federation.  In the following 
section, we provide an analytical foundation for the concept of vertical and horizontal 
fiscal balance in a federation. 
 
2.1  A Model of Optimal Unconditional Grants 
To keep the notation as simple as possible, we assume a federation with two 
levels of government—a central government and n subnational governments which could 
be states or municipalities.  The fiscal variables of the central government are denoted by 
a subscript 0 and the subnational governments’ fiscal variables by subscripts 1 to n.  Each 
subnational government is assumed to have a homogeneous population that can be 
represented by the income and preferences of a single resident.  The total population of 
the federation is one unit.  The population of jurisdiction i is immobile and equal to fi.  
Each government has a tax base, Bi, levies a tax rate, ti, on this base, and provides a 
public service, gi, at a constant unit production cost of ci, where i = 0, 1, …n.  Let Ti be 
the per capita lump-sum transfer received by (Ti > 0), or paid by (Ti < 0), subnational 
government i.  The budget constraints of the central government and a representative 
subnational government are given below: 
0 T f g c B t
n
1 i
i i 0 0 0 0 = ∑ − −
=
         ( 2 . 1 )  
0 g c T B t i i i i i = − +           i = 1, 2,..., n            (2.2) 
The central government could be a net recipient of the lump-sum transfers if the 
population-weighted sum of the per capita subnational governments’ transfers is   9 
negative.  Thus we envisage the possibility that one or more subnational governments 
makes transfers to the central government, although in most federations transfers flow 
from the central government to the subnational governments. 
  The well-being of a resident of subnational government i is reflected in the 
following reduced-form indirect utility function: 
V
i = V(t0, ti, g0, gi, Yi)           ( 2 . 3 )  
where Yi is the lump-sum income that a resident of subnational government i may 
receive.  The existence of lump-sum income is mainly a heuristic device that allows us to 
define a resident’s marginal utility of income,  0 Y V i i i > λ = ∂ ∂ .  Based on duality theory, 




















         ( 2 . 5 )  
where Bi0 is the central government’s per capita tax base in subnational government i.  
The central government’s total per capita tax base is equal to  ∑ = =
n
1 i 0 i i 0 B f B .  We will 
assume that each government’s tax base is decreasing in its tax rate,  0 t B i i < ∂ ∂ , i = 0, 1, 
…, n.  Our assumption that there are no tax externalities in the federation implies that 
0 t B j i = ∂ ∂  for  j i≠ .  In particular, a subnational government’s tax rate does not affect 
the tax bases of the other subnational government or the central government, and the 
central government’s tax rate does not affect the tax bases of the subnational   10 
governments.
2  Furthermore, we assume that a tax rate increase in one subnational 
government does not affect the input or output prices faced by the residents of another 
jurisdiction.  That is,  0 t V j i = ∂ ∂ j i≠ , j = 1, 2, …, n.  Finally, note that we are assuming 
that the central government has to levy the same tax rate, t0, across the entire federation. 
  We will find it convenient to define the marginal benefit that a resident of 
subnational government i receives from the central government’s public service and from 


























=           ( 2 . 7 )  
The absence of interjurisdictional benefit spillover effects is implied by our assumption 
that  0 g V j
i = ∂ ∂ for j i≠  > 0.  It also assumed that the public services do not affect the 
governments’ tax bases. 
  The marginal cost of public funds represents the cost to the private sector raising 
























= = ) (        (2.8) 
where  0 dt B d i i i < = η ln .  The numerator reflects the fact that the harm to households 
from a small tax rate increase is proportional to the tax base.  The denominator is the rate 
                                                  
2 These are very strong assumptions.  In this section we adopt a very simple framework in order to focus 
attention on the key issue of the role of intergovernmental grants in resolving the problems of vertical and 
horizontal fiscal imbalances. 
3 There is a very large literature on the interpretation and measurement of the MCF.  See Dahlby (2008) for 
comprehensive treatment of the concept and measurement of the MCF.   11 
of increase in tax revenues from a small tax rate increase, and therefore the ratio 
represents the cost to the society of raising an additional dollar of tax revenue through a 
tax rate increase. We assume that a higher tax rate causes the tax base to shrink because 
of tax avoidance or tax evasion, and therefore MCFi > 1 for ti > 0.  It is also assumed that 
the government is always on the upward-sloping section of its Laffer curve and therefore 
1 + tiηi > 0.  At the revenue-maximizing tax rate, ti = -1/ηi, the MCFi would be infinite 
because a small tax rate increase would impose a burden on households without raising 
any additional revenues.  The MCFi has the simple form given in (2.8) because we have 
assumed that there are no non-tax distortions in the economy, i.e. no externalities from 
the production or consumption of private goods and services, no monopoly price 
distortions, and no market distortions caused by asymmetric information. 
  The ethical standard that we adopt for evaluating a federation’s fiscal structure is 
the set of fiscal policies that a social planner, maximizing the following social welfare 







1 V f V f V f W W ..., , , =          ( 2 . 9 )  
This social welfare function is based on the population-weighted well-being of the 
representative individuals in each subnational government.  The social welfare function 
implicitly expresses the society’s willingness to trade off the well-being of individuals in 
different jurisdictions.  We will define the distributional weights that a society places on 
an additional dollar received by an individual in subnational government i as  
i
i
i V W λ ∂ ∂ = β ) ( .  Usually we think that the social welfare function expresses a society’s 
concern for social justice, and this will be reflected in pro-poor distributional weights 
such that the βs are higher for individuals with lower utility levels.  Here, however, the   12 
individuals also differ by location, and the social welfare function might express some 
regional preferences that go beyond income comparisons. 
  The Langrangian for the social planner’s problem is given below: 
















⎛ − ∑ − μ + = Λ
= =
.... , ,  (2.10) 
where μ0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the central government’s budget constraint and μi 
is the Lagrange multiplier for the subnational government i’s budget constraint.  The 
social planner maximize (2.10) with respect to the ti, gi, and Ti.  The first-order conditions 
with respect to the tax rates, intergovernmental transfers, and public service provisions 
can be expressed as follows: 
0 B 0 MCF
0 ⋅ ω = μ           ( 2 . 1 1 )  
i i i i MCF f ⋅ β ⋅ = μ           ( 2 . 1 2 )  
0 i i f μ = μ            ( 2 . 1 3 )  
0 0 g g c MB
0 0 ⋅ μ = ⋅ ω           ( 2 . 1 4 )  
i i g i i c MB f
i ⋅ μ = β           ( 2 . 1 5 )  
where 
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          ( 2 . 1 7 )    13 




g i g 0 0 MB f MB is the total marginal benefit from provision of the central 
government’s public service.  The 
0 B ω reflects the incidence of the central government’s 
taxes across the federation, and it will be a higher if the central government’s tax bases 
are relatively large in the subnational governments with high β values.  Similarly the 
0 g ω reflects the distributional pattern of the central government’s expenditures, and it will 
be higher if the benefits from increased provision of the central government’s public 
service are relatively high in subnational governments with high distributional weights. 
The Lagrange multiplier in the central government’s budget constraint, μ0, can be 
interpreted as the social marginal cost of raising revenue by the central government, 
SMCF0.  Given this interpretation for μ0, the first-order conditions can be interpreted as 
conditions for vertical and horizontal fiscal balance in a federation.  Vertical fiscal 
balance in taxation is achieved because the social marginal cost of funds is equalized 
between the central government and any subnational government i: 
i i i 0 B 0 SMCF MCF MCF SMCF
0 ≡ ⋅ β = ⋅ ω ≡    i  =1,2,…n    (2.18) 
This condition implies that the distributionally-weighted marginal cost of raising revenue 
is equalized between the two levels of government.  From this, it also follows that 
horizontal fiscal balance in taxation is achieved because the distributionally-weighted 
cost of taxation will be the same for all subnational governments: 
i i i j j j SMCF MCF MCF SMCF ≡ ⋅ β = ⋅ β ≡     i, j =1,2,…n      (2.19) 
Turning to the first-order conditions for public spending, vertical fiscal balance in 













          ( 2 . 2 0 )    14 
That is, the ratio of the distributionally-weighted marginal benefits of the public services 
provided by a subnational government and the central government equal their relative 
marginal costs of production. Equation (2.20) could be interpreted as the equality of the 
social marginal rate of substitution between g0 and gi with the marginal rate of 
transformation between g0 and gi. 
Similarly, horizontal fiscal balance in expenditures will also be achieved because 












           ( 2 . 2 1 )  
That is, the ratio of the distributionally-weighted marginal benefits from the public 
services provided by any two subnational governments will equal the ratio of their 
marginal costs of production.  Equation (2.21) could be interpreted as the equality of the 
social marginal rate of substitution between gj and gi and the marginal rate of 
transformation between gj and gi. 
  This analysis highlights the key role that unconditional transfers play in achieving 
vertical and horizontal fiscal balance in a federation because the optimal set of transfers 
equalizes the social marginal cost of public funds across all governments in the 
federation.  Furthermore, decentralized fiscal decision-making would implement the 
optimal fiscal system.  For example, if subnational government i receives the lump-sum 
transfer Ti, it would provide the level of the public good defined by the condition 
i i g c MCF MB
i ⋅ = .  Multiply both sides of this condition by βi, leads to the condition 
i 0 i i i g i c SMCF c MCF MB
i ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ β = ⋅ β and the conditions for vertical and horizontal fiscal 
balance would be achieved.    15 
  Having defined the conditions for vertical and horizontal fiscal balance, we can 
now provide a meaningful economic interpretation of the notion of a fiscal imbalance.  A 
vertical fiscal imbalance occurs when the SMCFs are not equalized between the two 
levels of government.  For example,  if SMCF0 < SMCFi for all i = 1, 2, …, n and the 
distributionally-weighted marginal cost of raising revenue at the federal level is less than 
at the subnational government level, there will be a vertical imbalance in taxation that 
will also be reflected in an imbalance in the spending between the two levels of 
government.  That is, the ratio of the distributionally-weighted marginal benefits from the 
subnational governments’ public services to the central government’s services will 
exceed the relative costs.  In this case, we will have excess taxation imposed at the 
subnational government level and excessive expenditure by the central government.   
A horizontal fiscal imbalance can similarly be defined as a situation in which the 
SMCFs differ across subnational governments.  These differentials in the social cost of 
raising revenue will also be reflected in an inefficient distribution of spending across the 
subnational governments.  The ratios of the distributionally-weighted marginal benefits 
from the public services provided by the subnational governments will not equal their 
relative production costs.  Thus our model provides economically meaningful definitions 
for the concepts of vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalance. 
If the set of intergovernmental transfers is not optimal, then there will be a net 
social gain from changes to the level and distribution of transfers.  Consider the case 
where initially there are no fiscal transfers and there is a vertical fiscal imbalance—the 
SMCFs for all the subnational governments are higher than the federal government’s 
SMCF.  The net social gain, NSG, from a one dollar per capita increase in transfers from   16 
the central government to all the subnational governments would be equal to the 
following: 
[] ∑ ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣







i i 0 0 i i i 0 B
n
1 i
i i i 0 0 f MCF MCF MCF f MCF MCF f NSG  (2.22) 
Thus the net social gain from increasing the lump-sum transfers to all the subnational 
governments can be decomposed into the gain the arises because MCFs of the 
subnational governments exceed the MCF of the central government and the gain or loss 
that arises if the distribution of the transfers is different from the distribution of the 
central government’s tax base across the subnational governments. 
  Although our model shows that concerns for distributional equity will normally 
play a major role in determining the magnitude and distribution of the intergovernmental 
transfers, a concern for distributional equity is not a necessary condition for the existence 
of an optimal set of intergovernmental transfers.
4  For example, if a society placed the 
same distributional weight on income increases by all individuals, such that βi = 1 for all 
i, then the measurement of the net social gain from a one dollar increase in transfers to all 





0 i i MCF MCF f NSG          ( 2 . 2 3 )  
In other words, the net social gain would be equal to the difference between the average 
MCF for the subnational governments and the central government’s MCF. In the absence 
                                                  
4 In this we differ with Oates (1999, p. 1127) who has argued that the justification for “intergovernmental 
equalizing transfers” is based on “social values” not efficiency gains.   17 
of distributional concerns, the NSG formula in (2.23) provides a measure of the extent of 
the vertical fiscal imbalance in a federation. 
  We can think of the implementation of the optimal set of unconditional 
intergovernmental transfers as occurring in two stages.  First, we could derive a set of 
transfers among the subnational governments that would equalize their social marginal 
cost of public funds at some level, μ.  We could think of this stage as the optimal fiscal 
equalization program.  Then we could devise a set of transfers from or to the central 
government to equalize the social marginal cost of funds between the two levels of 
government.  We could think of this stage as determining the optimal vertical fiscal gap 
for the federation.  With this two stage procedure in mind, we consider the optimal 
equalization grants in the next section and then in Section 2.4, we consider the transfers 
that will determine the optimal fiscal gap. 
 
2.2  Optimal Equalization Grants 
  Many federal countries, such as Australia, Canada, and Germany, provide 
equalization grants to their subnational governments on the basis of “deficient fiscal 
capacity” or “fiscal need”.  Equalization grants have been justified on the basis of the 
need to correct incentives for fiscally-induced migration, to promote fiscal equity in the 
federation, or to provide insurance against regional fiscal shocks.  See OECD (2007).  In 
this section, we outline the optimal taxation approach to fiscal equalization grants―one 
that is based on the desire to achieve horizontal fiscal balance, as defined by equations   18 
(2.19) and (2.21), by equalizing the social marginal cost of public funds across 
subnational governments.
5 
  We will use the same simple framework developed in the previous section to 
describe the optimal taxation approach to the design of an equalization transfer system.  
We will assume that the transfers occur between the subnational governments.  In the 
literature, this is referred to as a net equalization system, i.e. the central government does 
not contribute to the equalization system.
6  The objective of the optimal equalization 
system is to equalize the social marginal cost of funds across all subnational governments 








i i t 1
MCF  (2.24) 
and the provision of the public service in subnational government i will be 
*
i g .  Let 
*
i i i g c E = represent the per capita expenditure of subnational government i with 
horizontal fiscal balance in the federation.  It will be convenient to call Ei the expenditure 
needs of subnational government i.  We will discuss the determinants of expenditure 
needs in greater detail later in this section.  For the moment, we will take Ei as given and 
independent of the subnational government i’s fiscal capacity.  From the subnational 
government’s budget constraint, ti = (Ei – Ti)/Bi.  In addition, we will define the 
subnational government’s actual fiscal capacity as  i i i B η = φ
* < 0.  Note that fiscal 
capacity depends not only on the size of the government’s tax base, but also on the tax 
                                                  
5 For a more detailed discussion of the theory of optimal equalization grants, see Dahlby and Wilson 
(1994).  
6 See Dahlby (2008, Chapter 10) on the ability of a gross equalization system to eliminate horizontal fiscal 
imbalances.   19 
sensitivity of its tax base.  The greater the tax sensitivity of the base, the lower the 
government’s fiscal capacity because its marginal cost of public funds will be higher. 
Substituting these expressions in (2.24) and solving for Ti we obtain: 
μ
φ β
− φ + =
*
* i i
i i i E T  (2.25) 
With a net equalization system,  0 T f
n
1 j
j j = ∑
=
, and therefore summing the Ti in (2.25), we 






























where E is the average per capita expenditure need in the federation and 
* φ is the average 
per capita fiscal capacity of the subnational governments.  Note that since μ > 0, 
E + 
* φ  < 0.  Substituting (2.26) into (2.25), we obtain the following general formula for 


























i i i  (2.27) 
This equation shows that the optimal equalization transfer for each subnational 
government will be determined by three components.  It will be increasing in the 
subnational government’s expenditure need, Ei, decreasing with the subnational 
government’s fiscal capacity, 
*
i φ , and increasing its the distributionally-weighted relative 
fiscal capacity.  The latter term is positive to reflect an increase in transfers to subnational 
governments that have high fiscal capacities (and therefore subnational governments that   20 
would have higher tax rates levied on them) but that also have high distributional 
weights, i.e. where higher tax rates impose higher distributional burdens.  This third term 
takes equity considerations into account in the allocation of the tax burden across the 
subnational governments.  (As we will see, equity consideration will also influence the 
expenditure need component Ei). 
  It is interesting to consider two special cases of the general formula in (2.27).  
First, suppose the social welfare function does not embody distributional concerns, βi = 1 

















or the difference between the subnational government’s expenditure need compared to 
the national average and its fiscal capacity relative to the national average multiplied by 
the average expenditure need.  If, in addition, it is assumed that all subnational 
governments have the same expenditure needs and their tax bases are equally tax 























As shown below, (2.29) is the same as the equalization grant formula under the 
representative tax system (RTS) equalization grants. 
  Under most equalization grant formulas, a subnational government that receives a 
transfer will be able to raise a standard amount of revenue if it imposes a standard tax rate 
on its tax base, or: 
E B t B t T s s i s i = = +  (2.30)   21 
where Ti is the equalization transfer of subnational government i, Bi is its per capita tax 
base, ts is the “standard” tax rate, Bs is the “standard” per capita tax base, and E is the per 
capita expenditure that the subnational government will be able to finance. The 
equalization transfer is therefore equal to the difference between the standard tax base 
and the subnational government’s per capita tax base multiplied by the standard tax rate 
or: 
[ ] i s s i B B t T − =  (2.31) 






















=  (2.33) 
Substituting (2.32) and (2.33) into (2.31), we obtain (2.29).  In other words, the RTS 
system of equalization grants would replicate the optimal equalization grants if 
distributional equity is not important, if expenditure needs are the same in all subnational 
governments, and if the tax bases of all of the subnational governments have the same tax 
sensitivity, i.e. if βi = 1, Ei = E, and ηi = η for all subnational governments.  These are 
very strong assumptions, and in general the RTS equalization system, although widely 
viewed as the “gold standard” for equalization formulas, will only yield an approximation 
to the optimal equalization grants. 
  Our model of the optimal equalization grants emphasizes a point that has been 
largely ignored in the literature on equalization grants—a subnational government’s fiscal   22 
capacity depends on the tax sensitivity of its tax base as well as the size of its tax base.
7  
For example, suppose two subnational governments have the same per capita tax base, 
but one subnational government covers a large geographic area and the other a small 
geographic area.  According to the RTS approach, the two jurisdictions would have the 
same fiscal capacity and be eligible for the same equalization transfers.  However, the tax 
base of the smaller subnational government might be more tax sensitive than that of the 
larger subnational government because the residents on average live closer to the 
“border” where they can avoid paying the tax.  In this way, the smaller subnational 
government may have a lower fiscal capacity than a larger subnational government with 
the same per capita tax base because its tax base is more tax sensitive.  Similarly, 
subnational governments that are located near the “frontier” or border with another 
country may have more elastic tax bases than those that are located in the “interior”.  The 
RTS approach ignores differences in fiscal capacity that arise out of differences in tax 
base sensitivities, and therefore the RTS system may be biased against subnational 
governments that are smaller in size or have inherently more sensitive tax bases.  Of 
course, measuring fiscal capacity in a way that adjusts for the tax sensitivities of tax bases 
is difficult given our lack of knowledge about such sensitivities.  What the model shows, 
however, is that federations should not slavishly adhere to the RTS formula.  At best, the 
RTS formula can be thought of as an approximation to the optimal equalization grant, 
and some judicious modifications to the RTS equalization grants, such as adjustments for 
size or location of the subnational governments, might be made to more accurately reflect 
the subnational governments’ actual fiscal capacities. 
                                                  
7 On conventional measures of fiscal capacity for the US states, see Berry and Fording (1997), Compson 
(2003), and Mikesell (2007).   23 
  The model of optimal equalization grants also show how equity concerns and 
expenditure needs should be incorporated in the computation of equalization grants.  
Indeed, our model provides a precise definition to the term “expenditure needs”, a 
concept that is only vaguely defined in most of the literature on equalization grants.  In 
our model, the expenditure needs of a subnational government are 
*
i i i g c E = where 
*
i gi s  
the public service provision level which satisfies the following condition for horizontal 
fiscal balance in expenditures: 
() i i
i
i c g MB μ = β
*  (2.34) 
where μ is the social marginal cost of funds for all subnational governments under the 
optimal equalization grant scheme.  To discuss the expenditure needs in more detail, we 
will assume that the utility function of the representative household in subnational 
government i is U
i = Ci + αiln(gi – γi) + Ailn(g0  - Γi) where Ci is the consumption of 
private goods, the αi and Ai are positive parameters reflecting the strength of preference 
for local and national public services respectively, and γi and Γi are positive parameters 
reflecting the minimum required levels of local and national public services.  It is 
reasonable to expect that these parameters will vary across subnational governments.  
Indeed, it is the variation in “tastes” for public services across subnational governments 
which provides one of the strongest arguments for a federal form of government.
8  Given 
these differences in preferences and requirements for local public services, we would 
expect differences in expenditure requirements, as defined in (2.34), across subnational 
governments.  Given the utility function specified above, the expenditure needs 
component will be equal to: 
                                                  
8 See Oates (1999 and 2005) on the rationale for adopting a federal form of governments.   24 
μ
β α
+ γ = =
i i
i i i i i c g c E
*  (2.35) 
Thus the cost of producing the basic level of service, the strength of the preference for 
local public services, equity considerations and the social marginal cost of public funds 
will jointly determine the expenditure needs of a subnational government.  (Note that Ei 
is independent of the subnational government’s fiscal capacity except in so far as its 
fiscal capacity affects μ, and this would only be significant if the subnational government 
is large relative to the entire federation.)  Ei will generally be higher in subnational 
governments where the cost of producing public services are higher, but the elasticity of 
Ei with respect to ci would be less than one because with this type of preference function, 
the demand for local public services is price inelastic.  Specifically, 
( )( ) 1 E c E c c E i i i i i i i < γ = ∂ ∂ .  Thus higher costs of producing services in a subnational 
government would not be fully reflected in its expenditure needs.  The second component 
determining expenditure needs, αiβi/μ, will be higher if distributionally-weighted 
marginal benefit from providing public services is higher.  For example, Ei would be 
higher for public transit services in an urban area with relatively low income than in a 
rural area with the same income level.  This component of the expenditure needs will, 
however, be lower if the social marginal cost of funds is higher.  In other words, if the 
social marginal cost of funds is high, the expenditure needs component will be reduced to 
reflect the high cost of providing funds for the equalization grant program.  In other 
words, “affordability” as reflected in the social marginal cost of public funds will 
determine in part how generous the equalization program will be. 
  This presentation of the optimal equalization grant has ignored three important 
effects that equalization grants can have on the behaviour of subnational governments.   25 
First, subnational governments will usually be faced with a formula that will determine 
their equalization grant and the subnational government’s fiscal choice may affect the 
parameters of the formula and therefore the transfers that it receives.  See Smart (2007).  
These potential incentive effects will modify the design and level of equalization 
payments.  Second, most subnational governments levy taxes on more than one tax base 
and the equalization system may affect the tax rates that a subnational government 
imposes on its various tax bases to finance a given level of expenditures.  Dahlby and 
Wilson (1994) show how the optimal equalization grant formula would be modified when 
subnational governments levy more than one tax.  Third, many equalization grant systems 
are gross equalization systems—the central government finances the grants and 
subnational governments with high fiscal capacity or low expenditure needs do not 
contribute to the equalization fund.   
 
2.3  The Optimal Vertical Fiscal Gap 
The analysis in Section 2.1 indicated that in the absence of distributional 
concerns, a social planner would want to equalize the MCFs between the levels of 
government through a system of intergovernmental lump-sum transfers.  Of course, 
distributional considerations are always important in determining economic policies, but 
it useful to set them aside to focus on the “efficiency” rationale for vertical 
intergovernmental transfers.  The notion that intergovernmental grants can promote a 
vertical fiscal balance within a federation is often expressed in the literature, but this 
concept has not been given a strong analytical foundation.
9 
                                                  
9 However, see Boadway and Tremblay (2006).   26 
  In this section, we will focus on the role of intergovernmental transfers in 
achieving vertical fiscal balance in a federation.  The intergovernmental transfers 
required to achieve horizontal fiscal balances were dealt with in the previous section.  In 
this section, we will assume that all of the subnational governments are identical so there 
are no horizontal fiscal imbalances.  To further economize on notation, we treat the 
subnational governments as a single government, denoted by a subscript 1, while the 
central government is denoted by a subscript 0.  Furthermore, we assume that there are no 
vertical or horizontal fiscal externalities in the federation.  (We deal with horizontal 
expenditure  externalities in Section 3.0.)  Obviously this assumption means that we will 
ignore, for the time being, many potentially important issues in the determination of 
intergovernmental grants, but we can justify this simplification because we want to 
isolate the issue of vertical fiscal imbalance and highlight the role of intergovernmental 
grants in correcting this imbalance. 
  It will be convenient to represent each government’s tax base as follows: 
i i i i t b B η + = ln ln       i  =  0,  1     (2.36) 
where Bi is the per capita tax base for government i,  ti is its tax rate, ηi < 0 is the semi-
elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate, i.e.  i i i dt B dln = η and bi can be 
interpreted as the size of the tax base in the absence of taxation.  For simplicity, we will 
treat ηi as a constant.  A government’s own-source tax revenue can be expressed as 
follows: 




i i i i i b and t z where e z e b t B t R
i i i η = φ η = φ = = =
η  (2.37)   27 
where zi is the proportionate rate of change in the tax base as a result of taxation and 
i φ < 0 can be interpreted as a measure of the fiscal capacity of a government.
10  As 
previously noted, a government’s fiscal capacity depends not only on the size of its per 
capita tax base, but also on the tax sensitivity of the tax base.  In other words, a 
government’s fiscal capacity is lower if its tax base displays greater tax sensitivity.  
Including tax sensitivity in the measurement of fiscal capacity is extremely important in 
discussing vertical fiscal imbalance in a federation because the tax bases of subnational 
governments are almost always more tax sensitive than the central government’s tax 
bases.  Consequently, we will generally assume that  0 1 0 < φ < φ  even if b0 = b1. 
  With the optimal set of taxes and intergovernmental transfers, the MCFs of the 
two levels of government will be equalized.  This condition implies that z = t0η0 = t1η1 
and therefore the tax bases of both levels of government are reduced in the same 
proportion, -z.  This provides another way of defining vertical fiscal balance in 
federation, and another way of interpreting the Ramsey Rule for optimal taxation.  In 
other words, vertical fiscal balance is achieved in a federation with the implementation of 
the Ramsey Rule—distortionary taxes should reduce the tax bases of the two levels of 
government in the same proportion.  This condition can also be interpreted as 
implementing the Inverse Elasticity Rule of optimal taxation.  In the context of a 
federation, the Inverse Elasticity Rule implies that each government’s tax rate should be 
inversely proportional to the tax sensitivity of its tax base.  The optimal 
intergovernmental transfers allow a federation to implement these two alternative ways of 
expressing the conditions for optimal tax systems. 
                                                  
10 Here fiscal capacity is measured based on the size of the tax base in the absence of taxation.  In the 
previous section it was measured based on the current level of tax; hence, the difference in the notation 
used for the fiscal capacity variable.   28 
  This simple model can be used to derive an expression for the (approximate) 
optimal fiscal gap, where we define the fiscal gap as the proportion of the subnational 
governments’ expenditures that are financed by transfers from the central government.  
(Our model is very general, and the optimal transfers can be from the subnational 
governments to the central government under circumstances to be described below.)  The 
following equations determine the optimal intergovernmental transfers, tax rates, and 














=           ( 2 . 3 9 a )  
T g e z 0
z
0 + = φ           ( 2 . 4 0 a )  
T g e z 1
z
1 − = φ           ( 2 . 4 1 a )  
where the public services provided by the central and subnational governments, g0 and g1, 
have constant unit costs, c0 = c1 =1, the MB
i(.) functions are the marginal benefits from 
the public services, and T is the intergovernmental transfer.  If T > 0, the central 
government transfers funds to the subnational government.  If T < 0, the subnational 
government transfers funds to the central government.  These four equations determine 
g0, g1, z, and T.  Note that with the optimal transfers the marginal benefits from public 
services provided by the two levels of government are equalized because we have 
assumed that they have the same unit costs.  
  As with most optimal tax problems, it is impossible to obtain reduced form 
solutions for the policy variables without making some specific assumptions about   29 
functional forms.  In our case, a reduced form equation for the optimal vertical transfer 
can be obtained by adopting the following approximations to the four equations: 
( ) z 1 g 0 0 0 ε − α ≈           (2.38b) 
( ) z 1 g 1 1 1 ε − α ≈           (2.39b) 
( ) T g z 1 z 0 0 + ≈ + φ           (2.40b) 
( ) T g z 1 z 1 1 − ≈ + φ           (2.41b) 
In (2.38b) and (2.39b) we assume that the marginal benefit functions can be inverted to 
solve for gi and then the gi can be approximated using a first-order Taylor series.  The αi 
parameters can be interpreted as “expenditure requirements” of a government or in other 
words the level of service that would be provided with lump-sum taxation.  The εi 
parameters can be interpreted as the “price elasticities of demand” for the public services.  
In (2.40b) and (2.41b) we have approximated e
z by (1 + z).  Summing (2.40b) and (2.41b) 
and substituting for g0 and g1 from (2.38b) and (2.39b), we obtain the following equation 
that determines the approximate value of z: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) z 1 z z 1 z 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 + φ + φ = ε − α + ε − α        (2.42) 
The solution for z in (2.42) is still quite complicated, and we have examined the solutions 
for two special cases, namely ε0 = ε1 =-1 and ε0 = ε1 = 0.  In both cases, the expression for 
the optimal fiscal gap is the same and equal to: 
() 1 0 1
1 0 0 1
1 g
T
φ + φ α
φ α − φ α
=           ( 2 . 4 3 )  












> .  The central government should make 
transfers to the subnational government if the subnational government’s expenditure   30 
requirement relative to its fiscal capacity exceeds the central government’s expenditure 
requirement relative to its fiscal capacity.  In essence, this condition expresses the 
intuition that many economists have used to justify vertical fiscal transfers.  What we 
have done is to derive it from a model of optimal fiscal decisions, and we have provided 
precise definitions for the terms “expenditure requirements” and “fiscal capacity” that 
have been used to express these ideas.   
As previously noted, we normally expect  0 1 φ − < φ −  and therefore unless the 
expenditure responsibilities of the central government are correspondingly higher than 
those of the subnational governments, we would expect transfers to go from the central 
government to the subnational governments.  The model also predicts the intuitive results 
that the optimal fiscal gap will be higher when (a) the central government’s expenditure 
responsibilities are lower, (b) the subnational governments’ expenditure responsibilities 
are higher, (c) the central government’s fiscal capacity is higher, or (d) when the 
subnational governments’ fiscal capacities are lower.
11  The model therefore indicates 
how a country’s expenditure assignment and tax assignment determine its optimal fiscal 
gap. 
  The following numerical example may help to put the model in perspective.  
Suppose α0 = α1 = b0 = b1 = 100 and that η0 = -0.25 and η1 = -0.50.  Both levels of 
government have the same expenditure responsibilities and the same potential tax base.  
However, the subnational governments’ tax base is twice as tax sensitive as the central 
government’s tax base, and therefore the central government has twice the fiscal capacity 
of the subnational governments.  With these parameter values, T/g1 = 1/3, i.e. central 
                                                  
11 Volden (2007, Proposition 3, p.220) reaches somewhat similar conclusions about the size of 
intergovernmental grants based on a model of bargaining model between a central and subnational 
government.   31 
government transfers should cover one-third of the subnational governments’ 
expenditures.  Note for clarification that this would be a lump-sum grant which in 
equilibrium would be equal to one-third of subnational governments’ expenditures.  It 
would not be a matching grant of one-third of their expenditures.  Note also that this 
measure of the optimal fiscal gap does not include conditional grants to correct fiscal 
externalities or fiscal equalization grants to the subnational governments from the central 
government. 
 
3.0  Expenditure Externalities and Conditional Grants  
Expenditure externalities arise when the activities of one jurisdiction affect the 
well-being of individuals in the rest of the federation, and they can distort fiscal policies 
because subnational governments will have biased perceptions of the total marginal 
benefit from their expenditures.
12  Matching grants from the central government, based 
on the subnational government’s expenditures or revenues, can correct these biases by 
altering the “prices” that the subnational governments face when they make their 
decisions.  This corrective role of matching grants has been a standard topic in the fiscal 
federalism literature for many years.  See for example Gordon (1986) and Inman and 
Rubinfeld (1996).  The conventional rule for determining the corrective matching rate is 
to set it equal to the proportion of the total marginal benefit of the activity that accrues to 
                                                  
12 In this section, we are only concerned with horizontal expenditure externalities and we ignore vertical 
expenditure externalities and the horizontal and vertical tax externalities that can occur in a federation.  On 
the corrective mechanisms for the latter types of externalities, see Dahlby (2008, Chapter 9).   32 
non-resident.  However, this rule has to be modified when governments rely on 
distortionary taxes to fund their activities.
13   
  Let gi be a publicly-provided service by subnational government i at a constant 
marginal cost of production of c. If the central government provides a matching grant at the 
rate 
i g m for expenditures on gi, the optimal level of gi from the perspective of the 
subnational government i will be determined by the following version of the Atkinson-
Stern condition: 
( ) [ ]
i
g g i i i i R c m 1 SMCF SMB − − = ,   (3.1) 
where SMBi is the social marginal consumption benefit that gi provides to the residents of 
subnational government i, SMCFi is its social marginal cost of funds, and 
i i i
i
g dg dB t R
i = is the effect of an additional unit of the public service on its revenues, 
where 
i
gi R may be positive or negative. As an example, consider expenditures on a 
transportation infrastructure by a municipal government.  SMBi would be the social 
marginal benefits obtained by residents of the municipality i and 
i
gi R would be the change 
in its tax revenues because lower transportation costs may increase economic activity, 
wages, and profits in the municipality, thereby expanding the government’s tax bases.  To 
maximize the net social gain from this type of expenditure, the central government should 





g j i i i R R c SMCF SMB SMB − − = + ,   (3.2) 
                                                  
13 The same comment applies to the simple Pigouvian tax rule to correct private sector externalities—set 
the tax rate equal to the marginal external damage caused by the activity.  This rule is only valid when the 
government finances its activities with non-distortionary lump-sum taxes.    33 
where SMBj is the direct marginal benefit that accrue to the residents of other 
municipalities who use the transportation system, and  i j j
j
g dg dB t R
i = is the effect on the 
other municipalities revenues of an additional unit of gi.  SMBj and 
j
gi R could be positive 
or negative depending on whether they confer benefits or costs on the residents of other 
municipalities or increase or reduce their bases.  
  The above condition implies that the social marginal benefit from the activity will 
equal its total marginal cost, where the costs and benefits reflect distributional concerns 
and the use of distortionary taxes to finance spending.  This condition is based on the 
assumption that there is a system of lump-sum intergovernmental transfers, as described 
in Section 2.1, that equalizes the social marginal cost of funds across the governments, 
such that SMCFi = SMCFj = SMCF0 = SMCF, where SMCF0 is the marginal cost of 
funds for the federal government.  Under these conditions the optimal matching grant rate 
















= .   (3.3) 
i.e. the ratio of the direct and indirect marginal expenditure externalities to the total social 
marginal benefit from the provision of gi.  The direct marginal benefits should be weighted 
according to the distributional weights that apply to the residents of the subnational 
governments, and the revenue effects generated by an additional unit of gi should be 
weighted by the SMCF.  If the marginal expenditure externalities are negative, perhaps 
because of adverse impacts on the environment in neighbouring jurisdictions or because the 
activity reduces tax revenues in other jurisdictions, then the optimal matching rate will be 
negative and the central government should tax gi to discourage its provision. However, in   34 
many countries it would be difficult to enforce a measure such as this.  In Canada, for 
example, the constitution prohibits one level of government from taxing another level of 
government.  Under these conditions, perhaps the best that the central government can do is 
to seek an agreement among the subnational governments to limit the activities that 
generate negative expenditure externalities, or if possible change the expenditure 
assignment to remove the activity from the competence of the subnational governments. 
  Henceforth, we only consider the case where the expenditure externality is positive, 
i.e.  0 R SMCF SMB
j
g j i > ⋅ + , such that the optimal matching rate will be positive.  In 




















g SMB SMB R R
i i , then the matching rate is not affected by SMCF, and the 
convention rule for the matching rate,  ( ) θ + θ = 1 m
i g / , would apply.  A numerical example 
may help to clarify how the matching rate is affected by the use of distortionary taxes to 
finance spending.  Suppose SMBi = 1 and SMBj = 0.25 so that 20 percent of the total direct 
benefits of the activity accrue to people outside the boundaries of subnational government i.  
The matching rate under the convention rule would be 0.20.  However, suppose 




g i i . . = = , i.e. 33 percent of the additional revenue generated by the 
activity accrues outside of the boundaries of subnational government i.  If the SMCF is 1.5, 
the optimal matching rate should be 0.256.  If the SMCF is 2.00, the optimal matching rate 
would increase to 0.265.   
  For a pure direct expenditure externality, where  0 R
j
gi = , the matching rate is 
higher when the SMCF is higher if the activity reduces the revenues of subnational   35 
government i, given that the SMBj is positive and therefore m > 0.  For a pure indirect 
expenditure externality, where SMBj = 0, the matching rate increases with the SMCF if and 
only if  0 SMB R i
j
gi > .  Since we normally expect SMBi > 0, this implies that the matching 
rate will normally be increasing with the SMCF when the activity increases the revenue of 
other jurisdictions.  An example of an activity where SMBi is negative, but subnational 
government i undertakes the activity because 
i
gi R is large and positive, is tax enforcement.  
In that case, we might expect SMBj = 0 but  0 R
j
gi > as some residents of subnational 
government i move activities to neighbouring subnational governments to avoid paying 
higher taxes.  Under these conditions, the matching rate should be positive to encourage tax 
enforcement activity, but the matching rate would be decreasing in the SMCF. 
  As previously noted, the formula for the optimal rate for a matching expenditure 
grant (3.3) is based on the assumption that a system of block grants has equalized the 
SMCF among all the governments in the federation.  In other words, it was assumed that 
the federation has achieved vertical and horizontal fiscal balance as defined in Section 2.2.  
However, it is worthwhile to consider the optimal matching rate in a federation with fiscal 
imbalances, i.e. SMCFs differ between the subnational governments and/or between the 
central government and the subnational governments.  In this situation, the matching grant 
rate that maximizes the net social gain from the activity would satisfy the following 
condition: 
( ) c m SMCF c m 1 SMCF R SMCF R SMCF SMB SMB




g i j i ⋅ + − ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ + +  
On the left-hand side of the above condition, the revenue effects generated by an additional 
unit of gi are valued at the SMCF of subnational government i which undertakes this 
activity and the SMCF of the other subnational governments that receive more (or less) 
Comment [BD1]: Note 
corrections to the draft   36 
revenue as a result of this activity.  On the right-hand side, the first term represents the 
marginal social cost of subnational government i’s share of the cost of the project and the 
second term represents the marginal social cost of the central government’s share of the 
cost of the activity, where its financial contribution is valued at its SMCF0.  Under these 



















⋅ + + ⋅ +
⋅ +
=  (3.6) 
First note that the above formula for the optimal matching rate reduces to the formula in 
(3.3) if all governments have the same SMCF.  When the SMCFs are not equalized, 
perhaps because of an inadequate unconditional grant system, the revenue effects of the 
activity will be weighted by the SMCFs for the respective subnational governments and 
the term in brackets in the denominator of (3.6), which represents net social gain to the 
subnational government that undertakes the activity, will be weighted by its SMCF 
relative SMCF of the central government.  If we have a vertical fiscal imbalance in the 
federation, then the optimal matching rate will be higher than that given by (3.3) if the 
central government’s SMCF is lower that the SMCF of the subnational government that 
undertakes the activity and vice versa.  For example, using the same values for the direct 
and indirect marginal benefits from the activity, SMBi = 1, SMBj = 0.25,  4 0 R
i
gi . =  and 
2 0 R
j
gi . = , the optimal matching rate would be 0.347 if SMCF0 = 1.20 and SMCFi = 
SMCFj = 1.80, instead of 0.256 when SMCF is 1.50 for all governments.  The reason why 
the matching rate is substantially higher in this example where there is a vertical fiscal 
imbalance is that there is a social gain from shifting more of the costs of the activity to the 
central government because it can finance the activity at a lower social cost.  On the other   37 
hand, if there is horizontal fiscal imbalance, where the activity is undertaken by a “rich” 
subnational government with a low SMCF, then the matching rate will be reduced.  For 
example, if SMCFi = 1.20, SMCF0 = 1.5, and SMCFj = 1.8, the matching rate would be 
reduced to 0.248.  However, the matching rate could be higher or lower if the activity is 
undertaken by a poor subnational government with a high SMCF while the governments 
that benefit from the expenditure externalities have a low SMCF.  For example, if SMCFi = 
1.80, SMCF0 = 1.5, and SMCFj = 1.20, the optimal matching rate is 0.255.   
  The main point is that differences in the SMCFs among governments in a 
federation should be reflected in the matching grant formula.  This does not mean that the 
main purpose of the conditional grant system should be to address vertical and horizontal 
fiscal imbalances in a federation.  That task is best handled by unconditional grants, as 
outlined in Section 2.0, but if the unconditional grant system fails to equalize the SMCFs 
across all governments, then the matching grant system could incorporate elements that 
would address the fiscal balances as well as the expenditure externalities.  
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